The social and legal practices of blaming, praising, punishing and rewarding are inextricably linked with the process of 'holding responsible'. Blame, praise, and the like exist as means of holding agents to account that is distinct from, but reliant upon, attributions of responsible agency. When claims of accountability are made without access to an underlying shared attribution of responsibility, the communicative role of accountability is undermined. Disagreement over blame and praise is reduced to disparity: able to hear only that something is a bad or good thing, we are left unable to understand what the bad thing is, or why it is bad.
One such capacity is control. If control is taken as a condition of responsibility, then we are responsible when we are in control of what we do. 5 An agent's responsibility may be made conditional upon that 'person's ability to control her mental states and events leading to action in the relevant causal way, such that she is able to perform actions freely and thereby cause events to occur.' 6 On this account, when we lose control of ourselves or never had it in the first place, whether by reason of a magician's hypnosis or physical incapacity, we are not responsible. However, when I choose to knock someone else over, I may be distinguished from a domino that uncontrollably topples into another, and can be deemed responsible.
The control requirement imposes a threshold below which acts will be deemed outside the boundaries of responsibility. The exercise of control, as an element of moral agency, signifies the moral quality of, and agent's responsibility for, the act in question.
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It is this moral quality that gives rise to blame and praise. 8 Whatever form control is required to take, it will always be a test of sufficiency, one that must be satisfied if acts are to be of the quality necessary for responsibility.
The focus of discussion is typically concerned with the manner in which the control requirement should be framed: how control must be exercised in order for an agent to be deemed responsible. 9 However, prior to the issues arising from the implementation of the control requirement is the challenge presented by the inherent dependence on evaluative judgments that results from determining the responsible quality 5 Robert E Lane, 'Moral Blame and Causal Explanation' (2000) of acts on the basis of agents' control. By failing to assess responsibility on basis of shared transevaluative content, introducing control as a condition of responsibility undermines the possibility of responsibility being used as a means to render evaluative attitudes understandable.
Crucially, control is never absolute. If I attempt to fire a well-maintained gun and it misfires, then I remain responsible for pulling the trigger. However, my good fortune in this instance means no bullet left the chamber. External factors will almost always affect my acts, changing the outcome for better or worse. Controlled action is conditioned by this moral luck. 10 Two drivers may be equally negligent, but that negligence may have substantially different consequences if only one suffers the misfortune of injuring a pedestrian. 11 With so much occurring contemporaneously with our actions, there is no way we can be said to be in absolute control.
We might, as some do, treat equally negligent drivers as equally responsible without regard to the consequences of that negligence. 12 However, whilst it is possible to exclude clear cases of resultant luck, luck can never be excluded entirely from responsibility. Luck changes both the meaning and the consequences of individual acts.
We can be highly influential, but our actions, both possible and realised, are conditioned by external contingencies that we can neither predict nor control. Our lives are governed by moral luck and the unpredictability of consequences. 13 Requiring total control would undermine our responsibility, because we are never in control of the world; the experience with which to make our evaluations. The purpose of responsibility is undermined when it is based upon a judgment of the existence of control.
B. Alternate capacities: responsible when rational?
We might instead try to equate responsible agency with rationality. Thus, when we are rational, we may be said to be responsible. 18 However, if we are responsible, or particularly responsible, when we are rational, then the question of what reasons are right or best will determine our responsibility. Our status as rational is a product of the reasons we are deemed to have had: it is a product of an evaluative judgment, dependent upon an evaluative position.
Responsibility is a means of enabling evaluation in the face of disagreement. It enables speakers to express evaluative attitudes in a way that the listener can understand, even across lines of evaluative disagreement. From responsibility having this function, of conveying the speaker's position in an understandable way, it follows that responsibility is always communicated. If rationality is the basis of responsibility, then when attributions of responsibility are made, claims of rationality are also made. The reasons that form part of responsibility attributions are both spoken and heard. Regardless of whether reasons justifying responsibility are understood as internal or external to the agent who holds them, they are always externally perceived.
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Responsibility is not just held, but attributed. What matters for rationality, and therefore responsibility, is the external perception of reasons. The reasons relevant to responsibility are those perceived by the person who is making the responsibility attribution.
Consequently, the primacy and adequacy of reasons are viewed from an external perspective. The rationality that determines responsibility will be a product of the values we apply in deciding what to perceive as reasons.
When assessing what reasons someone had, we adopt evaluative stances.
Therefore, when we make claims of rationality, we make evaluative claims. If responsibility is rationality, then claims of responsibility are evaluatively dependent.
When we disagree using a rationality-based conception of responsibility, our responsibility attributions become subject to the same disparity as our evaluative attitudes. Imposing responsibility for rationality invokes claims of value that responsibility must supervene if it to provide a frame for understanding disagreement.
Responsibility does not resolve disagreements between evaluative claims -it enables disagreement, by creating a context that makes evaluative attitudes understandable. In making evaluative claims we may disagree over matters of evaluation, perception, or description. We may also disagree over whether an agent is responsible.
However, evaluative claims are not possible without a shared concept of what responsibility is. A model of rational responsibility creates disagreement not just over the evaluations that accompany responsibility, but over the concept of responsibility itself.
When rationality is relied upon for responsibility, responsibility becomes a product of evaluative perspectives of what is rational, of what reasons an agent had, rather than our shared understanding of the world. We lose the function of responsibility as a tool for making sense of accountability attitudes, as it becomes dependent upon evaluative stances, not shared human experience. Responsibility loses its purpose as a means of enabling communication across evaluative disagreement. With standards of rationality dependent upon evaluative stances, a rationality-based responsibility reduces our blaming and praising attitudes to opposing non-interactive evaluations. Responsibility becomes dependent upon evaluative stances, rather than common human content, and ceases to be able to explain our blaming attitudes or our disagreements over blame.
One possible avenue for avoiding this evaluative dependence is to seek to detach rationality from its connections with the right or wrong course of action. Raz's approach is of this sort: an attempt to tie responsibility not to rational action, but to 'rational functioning', whether it is expressed through rational or irrational action. Raz's position is defined by the Rational Functioning Principle (RFP), under which:
'Conduct for which we are (non-derivatively) responsible is conduct that is the result of the functioning, successful or failed, of our powers of rational agency, provided those powers were not suspended in a way affecting the action.'
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This approach looks to be premised not on rational failure or success, but on the exercise of rational capacities generally. Whether successful or not in the exercise of our rational capacities, 'we are responsible for actions in virtue of their relationship to our 20 Raz (n 11), 231.
In the absence of intention, the only difference between responsible action and irresponsible action is whether that action was the result of a failure of rational agency. The fact of the driver feeling agent-regret is in part determined by his capacity for emotion. It is also dependent upon his values and perspectives; he may not see killing a pedestrian as something regretful. However, the question of whether he feels agent-regret is preceded by the distinct question of whether the accident was something about which he could feel agent-regret. This is a question that does not examine any internal characteristics or capacities of the driver, but instead examines the event as a whole, looking to the driver's role. It asks whether this is an event that is apt for agent-regret. It was only with the particular relationship the driver had to events -that of a 'doer', in this case a 'driver' -that he was able to feel the particular form of regret that is agent-regret.
It was only because of the nature of events that regret for being an agent involved in events became possible.
Agents may often feel regret, but only feel agent-regret within a more limited set of circumstances. Williams' driver feels agent-regret because he identifies as the 'doer of the deed'. 45 Had a different driver been in a cab without a wheel, careering out of control along the same road and hitting the same pedestrian, he may feel deep regret over being in the cab at that time, but this was not regret for being an agent involved in events.
Rather, it was regret for being in the wrong place at the wrong time. An event such as this could not give rise to agent-regret, and there is a corresponding absence of any role for the driver in events. There was no space for agency, for becoming an agent was impossible in the absence of a steering wheel.
At the point where the pedestrian stepped out onto the road, it became the case that the pedestrian would die. However, at the point Williams' driver became a driver, at the point he started driving, it was not pre-emptively the case that the pedestrian would die. Thus, whilst there was not space for the driver to change the outcome once he began driving, there was space for agency: for an individual to become the driver who killed the pedestrian.
Only Williams' driver could become a driver who later kills. By contrast, the wheel-less passenger could not be a passenger, or a driver, who later kills. There was no possibility for him to enter into the event as a participant; he never became more than a bystander. He was never in a position to have a role. It is not mere inevitability that is important here, but rather inevitability at the point of involvement of an agent. The role that binds us to events may not initially connect to the eventual consequence of our involvement. Our roles can change, and the removal of control from our hands does not undermine our changing roles: it can only prevent our initial introduction. Once introduced, we may be bound up in events but blameless because of an inability to change things. This is distinct, however, from situations in which we never have the opportunity to become bound up at all.
C. From agency to responsible agents
The relationship between agents and events need not be described by reference to agents' control, or authorship, but instead the roles agents occupy within events. 46 Responsibility attributions must describe our position in relation to events, but need not be defined by the manner in which we enacted or controlled those events. Agent-regret attaches to those consequences that we helped to bring about, regardless of whether we intended to do so, 46 Donald E Polkinghorne, 'Narrative and Self-Concept ' (1991) whether the outcome was within our control, or whether we could have done anything different. 47 Agent-regret is regret for being someone who has done something, for being an agent with a role. It is conditioned upon the position of an agent within events as a 'doer', and it is only from this position that agent-regret (as distinguished from simple regret) is possible. This is another instance of the existence and inhabitation of an agentrole, distinguishing events from mere causal occurrences.
Implicit in agent-regret is the having of an 'agent-role' in events. Whilst the feeling of agent-regret depends upon our emotional perspectives and capacities, the possibility of agent-regret is a characteristic of events that indicates the existence of a space for agency. Whether agents have this space is a product of the events that occur around them: not of any rationality or control they themselves possess. The space for agency arises out of the way in which we describe events, such that they need a 'doer'.
When events, in the absence of that 'doer', would be causally under-determined, that doer inhabits the space for agency. They fill a gap that would otherwise exist within the causal chain, and in doing so take on a particular role as someone, rather than something, within a pattern of events.
That agency is conditioned upon a 'doer' role does not imply a requirement of action as a condition of agency. It is quite possible to become someone who did something not by acting, but by failing to act. What matters is not action, but agency, which exists in a range of forms beyond the boundaries of intention and control. The inhabitation of an agent-role takes a range of forms, including omissions. Agent roles do not only enable agent-regret, but also establish our agency within events. The possibility of agent-regret supervenes particular evaluative stances, existing above and across evaluative disagreement. The connection between agents and events that establishes agent roles is part of, and defined by, our shared human experience. It is constructed from our common perception, grounded in the actuality of human experience, such that the boundaries of responsibility can be demarcated by the structure of our descriptions.
Williams' driver became bound up in events by becoming a driver. Responsibility is a product of his 'doer' status. The boundaries of responsibility are demarcated by the structure of our descriptions. When we move from speaking about causes to agent descriptions, and individuals are said to have driven, or hit, or killed, they are responsible as agents. They are drivers, or hitters, or killers, and responsible on that basis alone. They are to be distinguished from non-responsible individuals who may be no less helpless in controlling outcomes, but whose movements are the consequence of some outside force that overcomes their agency, inhabiting the space they would otherwise take. When the space for agency is occupied or absent, we lose the ability to be responsible. When we have the space for agency, this implies our responsibility regardless of any rationality or control we may possess.
The agent-role of agent-regret demonstrates agents' capacities to make, be the subject of, and understand responsibility attributions -without requiring that responsible agents possess particular characteristics in order to do so. The space for agency arises simply because the description of events would be insufficient without the agent's presence. Without agency, causation would be under-determined; there would be something missing. When agents occupy this space, they can be held responsible on the basis of the descriptions of the pattern of events around them.
The possibility of agent-regret that accompanies such instances of responsible agency emphasises and enables the communicative role of responsibility. With the possibility of agent-regret comes the possibility of an agent understanding his or her own position within events. The first-personal self-reflection of agent-regret reveals the possibility of understanding attributions of responsible agency communicated by others.
The capacity for understanding one's own responsible agency is a consequence of the agency proscribed by the possibility of agent-regret, and it enables the shared understanding of attributions of responsibility. An agent with a role apt for agent-regret is not just as someone who as done something, but someone who can be the subject of responsibility attributions.
Just as the space for agency permits us to engage in self-reflective agent-regret, so too does it allow us to express evaluative attitudes towards others, and to understand those attitudes when they are directed towards us. Responsibility framed as a counterpart to agent-regret captures the differing possibilities for adults, infants and dominoes to have roles and attract responsibility. It does so whilst fulfilling the function of responsibility, invoking shared transevaluative content and in doing so endowing us with the tools necessary to convey accountability across evaluative boundaries.
Responsibility attributed on the basis of the possibility of agent-regret provides a shared, mutually understandable reference point for disagreement. This is responsibility that takes its justification from the particular role of the agent within events. Like events that result from intentional action, those that are apt for agent-regret demonstrate the special significance of the agent as something more than causal: as someone responsible.
Such an approach recognises the evaluative significance of responsible agency, without resorting to evaluative dependence. The possibility of agent-regret is a product of the description of events, described in terms of shared basic concepts like driver, hitter, and killer. Agent-regret is a product of our shared human experience, arising out of common definitions and understanding. The space for agency exists because there is causal space for an agent to have a role. This role is constructed from transevaluative content, such that Williams' truck driver's plight may be understood from any evaluative perspective. We can attribute responsibility so long as we can convey to an agent their role as an agent; the limits of responsibility coincide with the possibility of communication of agency.
Linking responsible agency to the rationality or control of the agents in question offers no satisfactory means of delineating the boundaries of responsible agency. The solution is to look not to the characteristics possessed by the agent, but instead to the character of the event they are involved in. Responsible agency is demarcated by the possibility of agent-regret. That an event is apt for agent-regret demonstrates the inhabitation of space for agency, such that we can become someone who did something, and the shared communicability of attributions of responsibility, such that we can become someone responsible for doing something. The possibility of self-reflective agent-regret enables the understanding of responsible agency.
Responsibility attributions can be made, and accountability communicated, by reference to shared human experience.
Responsibility reconsidered by reference to purpose
The attitudes of accountability are fundamental to the relationships between agents.
Responsibility is a means of grounding our attitudinal utterances in universally understandable attributions of agents' relationships to events. When assessed against this aim, attempts to define responsibility by reference to capacities of rationality fail to capture responsibility without reliance on evaluative stances, defeating the purpose of responsibility and leaving the attitudes we express either incomprehensible or meaningless. Basing responsibility on control forces us to make judgments on how much, and what kind, of moral luck can be accepted. In doing so, it renders responsibility evaluatively dependent, undermining its function as a basis for our evaluations. A third approach is to look not to the capacities of agents, but to the roles they play. These roles carry inherent significance in demarcating agents as agents, distinguished from causes by having something said about them beyond simply what they have done.
Agent roles justifying responsibility coincide with the possibility of agent-regret.
They exist only within the space for agency, a characteristic of events -not agents -that allows for the introduction of an agent as more than a cause. Within this space we find responsibility unbridled by agent characteristics and disconnected from evaluative positions. With this meaning, we find responsibility with purpose.
